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Abstract
Understanding the causal impact of beliefs on contributions in Threshold Public Goods
(TPGs) is particularly important since the social optimum can be supported as a Nash Equi-
librium and best-response contributions are a function of beliefs. Unfortunately, investiga-
tions of the impact of beliefs on behavior are plagued with endogeneity concerns. We
create a set of instruments by cleanly and exogenously manipulating beliefs without decep-
tion. Tests indicate that the instruments are valid and relevant. Perhaps surprisingly, we fail
to find evidence that beliefs are endogenous in either the one-shot or repeated-decision set-
tings. TPG allocations are determined by a base contribution and beliefs in a one shot-set-
ting. In the repeated-decision environment, once we instrument for first-round allocations,
we find that second-round allocations are driven equally by beliefs and history. Moreover,
we find that failing to instrument prior decisions overstates their importance.
Introduction
One major obstacle to, and shortcoming of, the study of the relationship between beliefs and
behavior is the potential for beliefs to be endogenous. As one example of many, consider the
false-consensus effect. While the traditional assumption is that beliefs are exogenous and thus
causally related to behavior, if individuals believe that others are ‘like them’ then endogeneity
becomes a concern (e.g., [1]). With reciprocal or conditional-cooperator classes of preferences,
the role of beliefs is fundamentally important to understanding individual decisions (e.g., [2, 3]
and the review in [4]). If beliefs are endogenous, however, inferences based on the relationship
between elicited beliefs and contributions are more difficult to interpret as the causal relation-
ship is unclear. While an endogenous relationship between beliefs and behavior has been spec-
ulated, the presence of endogeneity remains an open empirical question. We thus design
instruments, in an experimental setting, by providing information on the contributions of sub-
jects who played the game previously. The mean and standard deviation of the information we
provide act as valid and relevant instruments for beliefs allowing us to test for endogeneity. Per-
haps surprisingly, we fail to find evidence that beliefs are endogenous in either the one-shot or
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repeated-decision settings. These results contribute to a growing discussion regarding the
causal effect of beliefs in experimental games (see e.g., [5] for trust games and [6] for public
good games).
Threshold Public Goods (TPGs) are a type of nonlinear public good [7]. For voluntary pro-
vision to occur, contributions must be large enough to cover the cost of the project. If contribu-
tions do not reach this threshold, then the good is not provided. In the TPG environment, the
threshold (or provision point) introduces an infinite number of Nash equilibria to the game: a
non-efficient, zero contribution Nash equilibrium exists, as do a multitude of efficient Nash
equilibria where the threshold is exactly met. In comparison, the standard linear public good
experiment has a unique Nash equilibrium at zero contributions. As a result, beliefs are partic-
ularly relevant in the threshold setting, both because of social preferences and because they
help determine a Nash player’s best response.
Much of the previous research on TPGs has examined the impact of institutional design on
efficiency. Returning contributions in the case that the threshold is not attained (a money-back
guarantee, [7, 8]), refunding or re-investing contributions in excess of the threshold [9, 10]
have both been shown to positively impact contributions and provision. These design features
act to mitigate the risk associated with contributing, thus dampening the relationship between
beliefs about others’ contributions and behavior. We therefore do not include opportunities for
either rebates or refunds in our design.
The role of beliefs in TPGs has been almost completely ignored in the previous literature,
even though beliefs are fundamental to understanding contributions in this decision environ-
ment. To the authors’ knowledge, the closest papers investigating beliefs examine donation
matching [11] or step-level public goods (SLPG), which is a situation where individuals simply
choose whether or not to contribute all of their endowment [12, 13]. If enough members of the
group contribute, then the threshold is attained. Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram [12] estab-
lish that beliefs about the probability of contributing can be reasonably elicited and that beliefs
weakly determine behavior. They also examine the process of forming expectation in SLPG
games [13], comparing the evolution of beliefs between partners, strangers, and nature condi-
tions. In this SLPG environment, elicited beliefs measure the subjective probability about the
number of contributors. They find that beliefs are related to behavior: when a subject believes
that their contribution will push the group over the threshold from non-provision to provision
they are more likely to contribute. Since their focus is on the process of forming beliefs, they do
not manipulate beliefs, or systematically examine the relationship between beliefs and contri-
butions, which we do.
We conduct a TPG experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). In the baseline, we
simply elicit beliefs. Previous research indicates that the belief elicitation procedure can impact
stated beliefs [14, 15] and the very act of eliciting beliefs can alter behavior [16, 17]. However,
players with asymmetric profit opportunities, where the immediate reaction and the strategic
reaction differ, are the most likely to be impacted by the process of eliciting beliefs [18]. We do
not test alternate elicitation procedures, our procedure is constant across treatments. Specifi-
cally, subjects are asked to state their belief about the contribution of the other three group
members’ contributions as in [16]. In the first treatment, we manipulate beliefs without decep-
tion by providing them with information about previous contributions. The implications of
providing information, which can alter beliefs about others actions or the social norm, has been
demonstrated in several contexts, including charitable fund-raising [19–21] and public goods
games [22]. We utilize a comparable methodology of informing subjects of actual decisions of
previous subjects in order to manipulate their beliefs without deception. The information we
provide consists of a set of ten decisions selected from those made by participants in earlier ses-
sions. We use the mean and standard deviation of this information set of (over-identifying)
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instruments for beliefs, allowing us to both test for the validity of our instruments and to esti-
mate the causal relationship between beliefs and behavior. We expect the mean of the informa-
tion set to inform the expected average contribution, while the standard deviation should
impact the perceived likelihood of actual contributions being close to the expected average.
With less precise information, an individual’s degree of optimism (pessimism) would impact
the elicited belief positively (negatively), which provides a channel through which the standard
deviation could influence the elicited belief (we provide tests to confirm that it does). Econo-
metric testing indicates that these instruments are relevant and valid. In the second treatment,
subjects make two decisions—first without information, and then with information on previous
contributions. This allows us to address the impact of history on decision making.
Perhaps surprisingly, and contrary to the concern in the profession, we fail to find evidence
that in either a one-shot or repeated-decision environment that beliefs are endogenous using
this design and elicitation. In contrast, history (lagged contribution decisions) does require
instrumenting. We find that TPG contributions are driven equally by beliefs and prior
contributions.
To the authors’ knowledge, there are only two similar papers in the public goods literature,
both of which use a linear public goods setting [6, 23]. Bechtel and Scheve [23] conduct a
multi-country field experiment, using an experimentally designed instrument and survey, to
examine conditional cooperation and the causal effect of expected cooperation in a linear pub-
lic goods game. They find a strong positive relationship between beliefs and contributions.
They only have one instrument and do not discuss the necessity of instrumenting in their
setting.
Smith [6] uses lagged contributions as instruments in a repeated linear public goods game.
Other differences include the type of public good, subject pool, number of decisions, and level
of feedback. He finds significant evidence of endogeneity of beliefs and that beliefs about others
contributions are the primary determinant of own contributions. There are several differences
between our study and Smith’s [6], besides the type of public good, which may impact the
potential endogeneity of beliefs. Primarily, we elicit beliefs before the contribution decision
whereas his belief elicitation is on the same screen as the contribution decision, which may
enhance consistency between the two.
In other decision environments, several research teams have incorporated instruments into
their experimental designs. For example, the causal effect of beliefs in the trust game are exam-
ined [5]. In this paper, they introduce random variation in the trustee response, while we
manipulate the information set. They find that the OLS and IV estimates are not significantly
different from each other, suggesting that beliefs are not endogenous in their setting. Note that
their marginal effect on belief ranges from 0.54 to 0.56 which is in line with Smith’s IV esti-
mates (ranging from 0.45 to 0.57 depending on the model) and ours (0.45 for the repeated-
decision), suggesting that the relationship between beliefs and behavior may be relatively
robust even across very different decision environments. This paper is unable to reject the exo-
geneity of beliefs in their prisoner’s dilemma environment. Additionally, democratic institution
choice [24] and examine cash balances in auctions [25] are also examined.
Primarily our contribution is to the study of the relationship between beliefs and behavior.
We investigate a TPG experiment, where we might expect beliefs to be more important than
they are in a more standard linear public good experiment [13]. We propose instruments for
beliefs and offer one of the first studies to systematically examine beliefs in this environment.
We show that although beliefs are important to the decision making process, they are not
endogenous in this setting. These results add to a broader literature which seeks to improve
our understanding of how individuals interact when faced with social dilemmas [26–29]. We
next detail the experimental design and implementation before turning to the results.
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Methods
Experimental Design
We use the AMT platform to conduct a standard, single shot threshold public good game.
AMT is an online labor market that has recently drawn increased interest as platform for con-
ducting behavioral experiments. The platform has been examined in a number of recent meth-
odological papers. Amir et al. [30] find relative parity between lab and AMT experiments, even
when the stakes are very small in the online setting. Berinsky et al. [31] find that AMT subjects
tend to be more attentive than undergraduate subjects or professionally recruited subjects in
standard economic games and surveys. Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser [32] conduct a number
of standard economic games on AMT and find that their results are consistent with results
obtained in laboratory experiments. Goodman et al. [33] suggest implementing a quiz to check
for the attentiveness of subjects and limiting of samples to the United States to prevent lan-
guage problems (both of which we do here). The emerging consensus in the literature is that
the results of studies conducted on the AMT platform are comparable to laboratory results for
a number of standard games when care is taken with experimental design.
Potential subjects chose to participate in our experiment by selecting it from a list of thou-
sands of Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) on the AMT website. They were shown a recruit-
ment screen with a link to the experiment website and conditions for participating. We limit
the subject pool to English speaking subjects over the age of 18 living in the United States. We
further implemented a program to check the subject’s unique AMT numerical identifier
against previous participants in order to prevent any subject from participating more than
once.
Once a potential subject chose to accept our task they were directed to an informed consent
page. This informed consent page was approved, along with our study by the Institutional
Review Board at the University of Massachusetts. Subjects were given information about what
would be expected of them during the experiment and told they would earn 10 cents with an
opportunity to earn a substantial bonus. We use this language in keeping with the norms of the
AMT payment system. The 10 cents HIT served as the show-up fee, and was paid immediately,
while the bonus consisted of the experimental earnings. All of our experiment web pages were
viewed by subjects as a frame in the AMT website so subjects did not ever have to leave the
AMT website. Subjects were paid within 48 hours, which is consistent with AMT best
practices.
After reading and agreeing to the informed consent page, subjects were shown a set of
instructions and examples, a sample of which is available in the Online Appendix (http://bit.ly/
1MR7o96). The experimental framework is a four-player, one-shot TPG, with no refunds or
rebates (thus maximizing the risk to cooperation, see [34] for a review). Payoffs, πi to player i
in a TPG game are as follows:
pi ¼
Ei  ci if
P
ici < PP
Ei  ci þ R if
P
ici  PP
(
ð1Þ
where PP is the provision point, Ei is i’s endowment, ci is i’s voluntary contribution and R is
per-person the return from the TPG. Payoffs were determined according to Eq 1, where E = 10
cents is their endowment, R = 20 cents is the per-person value of the public good and PP = 20
cents is the provision point. Subjects could choose to contribute any integer between zero and
ten, inclusive, to the group account. The remaining tokens are then allocated to their private
account.
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After completing the instructions, all subjects take a quiz to determine their understanding
and to assist with eliminating computerized agents. Subjects in all treatments receive the same
instructions and quiz. After the quiz, subjects continue on to complete either the No Informa-
tion, Information, or History treatment of the experiment. In the No Information (NI) treat-
ment, we elicit subject’s subjective beliefs about the average contribution of the other three
members of their group (as in [16]). We offer a 20 cent bonus for guessing correctly. Paying for
correctness has a few advantages in our setting. First, for the AMT subject pool we needed a
mechanism that was easily and quickly explained. Second, it avoids many of the problems dis-
cussed in the literature [35]. In linear public goods games, eliciting beliefs before the allocation
decision has been shown to reduce contributions and increase equilibrium play [17]. For our
design, multiple equilibria exist, and so the impact of eliciting beliefs on equilibrium play is less
clear. If the elicitation increases strategic thinking, then subjects may play closer to their best-
response function than they otherwise would. This is not the research question we address
here, and the elicitation is constant across all treatments. We have no a priori reasons to expect
that subjects in separate treatments would react differently to the elicitation.
After the belief elicitation, subjects make their contribution decision, complete a brief sur-
vey, and exit the experiment. Upon completion, each subject is matched with three other sub-
jects who have not yet been matched and paid their bonus. Specifically, and unknown to the
participants, subjects were matched in order of completion. Along with the bonus, subjects
received an accompanying message explaining how their bonus was calculated. The asynchro-
nous nature of our experiments differs from previous Mechanical Turk studies where subjects
are recruited to an online waiting room and then play synchronous games, but this difference
is beneficial for several reasons. First, it does not allow for collusion because subjects are not
aware of how they are being grouped. Second it allows for subjects to complete the experiment
in a very short amount of time, thus maximizing the effective payoff to participation. If the
total contribution to the group account equaled or exceeded 20, then each group member
receives 20 cents plus however many cents they kept in their personal account.
In Information (I) treatment, subjects participate in the same one-shot TPG except that we
exogenously manipulate beliefs after subjects complete the quiz and before we elicit their
beliefs.
In order to provide a stronger test of the impact of the manipulated information on beliefs
and behavior, we conduct the History (H) treatment. In this treatment, subjects make two allo-
cation decisions (H-NI and H-I), and are paid for both. Note that the matching and payment
does not occur until after the entire experiment is completed, so there is no feedback between
decisions. For the first decision (H-NI), subjects first make a No Information allocation deci-
sion. After making this decision, subjects are then shown an information set, complete a second
belief elicitation, and make a second allocation decision (H-I), as in the Information treatment.
Implementation
Data for this study was collected through AMT. A total of 2039 subjects participated in Study 1
between July 2013 and June 2014. Once we implement our screening for automated players, we
are left with a total of 1447 usable observations, 445 in the NI treatment, 564 in the I treatment
and 438 in the H treatment. We implemented a quiz to gauge attentiveness, following the pro-
cedures in [33]. Subjects had to answer two multiple choice questions (with five possible
answers). They were given hypothetical contributions and asked to calculate payoffs. In order
to proceed with the experiment, subjects had to correctly answer both questions in the same
attempt. We then discarded all observations where subjects failed the quiz more than four
times. These subjects earned an average of 24.8 cents in the NI and I treatments and 50.7 cents
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in the H treatment, in addition to the 10 cents they were paid for accepting the task. The ses-
sion lasted an average of 3 minutes and 40 seconds (4 minutes and 20 seconds) [4 minutes and
52 seconds] for the NI (I) [H] treatment. If a computer error made a subject’s data unusable,
they were paid a $1 bonus and have been excluded from these numbers. A concern raised with
Mechanical Turk is that the incentives are too low to impact behavior. Research suggests that
subjects from Mechanical Turk respond to incentives in much the same way as other popula-
tions [32].
Instruments
We create instruments by exogenously manipulating the beliefs of subjects in a manner similar
to [21]. We show subjects an information set containing contributions (and the mean of those
contributions) from ten anonymous, randomly selected, previous participants. Subjects are spe-
cifically (and truthfully) told that these previous participants will not be in their group and that
the contributions of these previous participants will not impact their payoff. We therefore
ensure that the instrument is exogenous and that any influence on contributions occurs through
beliefs and not from strategic considerations. A sample manipulation is shown in Fig 1.
Fig 1. Sample Information Manipulation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.g001
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Next, we need to ensure that there is sufficient variation in the information sets. For both I
and H, we allow the natural variation in information by randomly drawing previous contribu-
tions. For a subset of the sample (196 out of 564 in I and 199 out of 439 in H), we use a stronger
manipulation of beliefs, where we select specific prior contributions to create four information
sets, two with a low mean (2) and two with a high mean (8) (similar to the controlled previous
donor information in [21]). For each mean, we also have a lower standard deviation (0.89) and
a higher standard deviation (1.84). Participants randomly participate in one of the four combi-
nations. Note that the low and high mean could both discourage contributions. As illustration,
if an individual believed that individuals contributed 2 (8) each, for a total of 6 (24), then it
would never be a money-maximizing best response to contribute. Within the each standard
deviation, numbers were chosen to mirror each other. These controlled information sets are
shown in Online Appendix Table 1 (available at http://bit.ly/1MR7o96). The distribution of
the means and standard deviations are shown in Figs 2 and 3.
Since beliefs may be endogenous, one instrument is required to just-identify the model.
However, if the model is just-identified, then we are unable to test whether instruments are
valid. We therefore propose two instruments in order to over-identify the model. The
Fig 2. Means of Observed Information Sets. Note: The spikes at 2 and 8 are from the experimenter-
chosen information sets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.g002
Fig 3. Standard Deviations of Observed Information Sets. Note: The spikes at 0.89 and 1.84 are from the
experimenter-chosen information sets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.g003
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instrumental variables (IVs) we propose are the mean and standard deviation of the observed
information set. The mean of the information set is meant to inform the expected average con-
tribution. Beliefs regarding expected contributions of others are important for TPGs since
one’s optimal decision depends on the contributions of others.
The standard deviation captures the precision of the information treatment. With less pre-
cise information, an individual’s degree of optimism (pessimism) would impact the elicited
belief positively (negatively). Thus, while the standard deviation of information does not have
to influence beliefs, there is a channel through which it could influence beliefs. Other aspects of
the information set may impact beliefs as well. However, using too many instruments can give
rise to weak instrument issues (see e.g. [36]). We use the standard deviation as an over-identify-
ing instrument so that we can test for the validity of the instruments. Estimates without using
the standard deviation are not significantly different (available upon request).
In order to consider the mean and standard deviation of the information set as proposed
instruments, first we need to confirm the first-order condition, that the instruments are valid
(uncorrelated with allocations after controlling for the other determinants of behavior). Next,
to satisfy the second-order condition, the manipulation has to actually ‘work’: that is, the pro-
posed instruments need to be relevant (correlated with beliefs).
For our preliminary evaluation of the validity of the proposed instruments, we need to con-
firm that they do not significantly, independently influence contributions once the other
explanatory variables have been included in the regression. That is, controlling for beliefs, the
mean and standard deviation of the information set do not offer additional explanatory power.
If either of the proposed instruments were significant in this regression, it would indicate that
they would be correlated with the errors from a regression of beliefs on allocations, and thus
not be considered valid.
Results from the OLS regression are shown in Table 1. The dependent variable is the
amount allocated to the group account. Marginal effects are shown, with standard errors in
parentheses. We see that both of the proposed instruments are statistically and economically
insignificant. The instruments thus meet the first criteria. Both instruments are also statistically
insignificant when regressed independently (available on request).
We next need to consider the relevance of the proposed instruments. We address relevance
in two manners. First, we need to confirm that providing information impacts beliefs. Fig 4
shows the distribution of beliefs for each of the four decisions (NI, I, and both H decisions).
There is a significant impact of providing any information on the distribution of beliefs (Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov, all p< 0.01). We see a shift in the modal response of 5 in the decisions with
Table 1. Validity: Do Proposed Instruments Independently Impact Contributions?
I Treatment
Belief 0.713*** (0.058)
Information Mean -0.026 (0.044)
Information Standard Deviation 0.028 (0.116)
Constant 1.977*** (0.356)
N 564
Adjusted R2 0.2361
***p  0.001
Notes: OLS regressions, with the allocation to the TPG as the dependent variable. The regression includes
the proposed instruments after accounting for the other relevant variables in the regression. Marginal
effects are shown, with standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.t001
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no information (NI and H-NI) to 6 in the decisions where information was received (I and
H-I, proportions tests all p< 0.01).
For the mean and standard deviation of the information set to be relevant instruments, they
need to be significantly correlated with beliefs. Table 2 provides the first-stage regression, the
OLS estimates for the relationship between the proposed instruments and the elicited beliefs
for the I treatment. We focus on the I treatment for evaluating the potential of these instru-
ments because the H-I treatment will also have to account for history, which is endogenous by
construction. We will return to the analysis of H-I in the Results Section. There is a strong posi-
tive relationship between the mean of the information set and the elicited belief. Likewise, there
is a positive relationship between the standard deviation of the information set and the elicited
belief. Thus, both the mean and standard deviation of the information set are strongly
Fig 4. Beliefs of Individual Allocations to the Group Account, by Treatment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.g004
Table 2. Relevance: Are Potential Instruments Correlated with Beliefs?
I Treatment
Information Mean 0.281*** (0.029)
Information Standard Deviation 0.256** (0.084)
Constant 3.531*** (0.212)
N 564
Adjusted R2 0.1677
**p  0.01,
***p  0.001
Notes: The first-stage regression is modeled as OLS with the elicited belief as the dependent variable.
Marginal effects are shown, with standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.t002
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correlated with beliefs, suggesting that they are relevant. We will provide further tests of the
quality of the proposed instruments along with the econometric results in the Results Section.
Results
Now that we have two potential instruments and evidence suggesting that they are valid and
relevant, we turn to our analysis of the relationship between allocations and beliefs. Table 3
presents the average allocation, belief, and number of individual observations for each of our
treatments and decisions. The distribution of beliefs by treatment was shown previously in Fig
4 and the distribution of allocations is shown below in Fig 5.
Since subjects do not interact or receive any feedback, we consider each individual to be an
independent observation for this analysis. The first set of rows in Table 3 contains the data
from the one-shot treatments, NI and I. The second set of rows contain data from the H
Table 3. Average Allocations and Elicited Beliefs, by Treatment.
One-Shot NI I
Allocation 5.99 (2.51) 5.86 (2.13)
Belief 5.63 (1.42) 5.57 (1.48)
N 445 564
History H-NI H-I
Allocation 6.11 (2.15) 5.97 (2.20)
Belief 5.62 (1.51) 5.73 (1.62)
N 438 438
Standard errors in parenthesis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.t003
Fig 5. Individual Allocations to the Group Account, by Treatment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.g005
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treatment, where each subject makes two decisions with a surprise re-start and information
manipulation after the first decision. H-NI is in the first column of data and H-I is in the sec-
ond. Thus, a vertical comparison holds constant the information condition (with or without
the information manipulation) while a horizontal comparison provides the impact of receiving
any information.
In all treatments, allocations are significantly higher than beliefs (t-tests, all p< 0.01). We
do not see treatment differences in the average allocation to the group account (t-tests, all
p> 0.05). Regarding the distribution of allocations to the group account, there are no signifi-
cant differences between treatments. The only exception is that the distribution of allocations
is significantly different within the H treatment, with the first decision (H-NI) having a differ-
ent distribution than the second (H-I, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< 0.01).
We next turn to our analysis of the relationship between allocations and beliefs in the one-
shot decision, provided in Table 4. The first column shows the estimates without IVs (using
OLS) and the second column shows the estimates with IVs (using 2SLS). While one might
expect a nonlinear relationship between beliefs and contributions (based on the best response
functions), testing indicates that a linear specification is an approximate description of the rela-
tionship (results available upon request).
Tests for the quality of and need for instruments are at the bottom of the table. The Ander-
son LM test indicates that we have full column rank in all cases. This is a test of under-identifi-
cation, and the p-value of zero indicates that both instruments are relevant. Next is the Cragg-
Donald Wald F, which is a test of weak identification. If the instruments were correlated with
the potentially endogenous regressor but only weakly, then the estimator would not perform
well. The test statistic is 57.7, which is above the Stock-Yogo 10% critical value of 19.93, indi-
cating that our proposed instruments are not weak (Stock and Yogo [37]). Finally, the Sargan-
Hansen test evaluates whether the instruments are jointly valid (uncorrelated with the error).
The p-value of 0.69 for the Sargan Statistic indicates that we fail to reject validity. Combined
Table 4. Relationship between Allocations and Beliefs in a One-Shot TPG: with and without
Instruments.
I Treatment
No IV IV
Belief 0.702*** (0.053) 0.648*** (0.128)
Constant 1.948*** (0.304) 2.247** (0.715)
N 564 564
Adjusted R2/Centered R2 0.2383 0.2382
Tests:
Anderson LM (p) 96.232 (0.00)
Cragg-Donald Wald F 57.706
Sargan Stat (p) 0.161 (0.69)
Wu-Hausman F (p) 0.213 (0.64)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 (p) 0.214 (0.64)
**p  0.01,
***p  0.001
Notes: The No IV specifications are modeled as OLS. The IV specifications are modeled using 2SLS. The
instruments used are the mean and standard deviation of the information set. Marginal effects are shown,
with standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.t004
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with the evidence from Tables 1 and 2 above, we thus conclude that the proposed instruments
are both valid and relevant in this decision framework.
We find a surprising result: despite the serious concerns about belief endogeneity in the pro-
fession, we do not find that beliefs are endogenous in this setting. The p-value of 0.64 for both
the Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that both estimators are consistent.
If beliefs were endogenous, then OLS would be inconsistent. Thus, we fail to reject the exogene-
ity of beliefs. In the one-shot setting (I Treatment) contributions are made up of a base contri-
bution of approximately 2 cents plus 70% of the elicited belief.
To examine the robustness of this result, we next turn to the H Treatment, where individu-
als make two decisions, with a surprise re-start and receive the information manipulation in
between the decisions. In order to examine the second decision (H-I), we also need to include
the first-round decision to avoid omitted variable bias. However, the first-round decision
(H-NI) is essentially a lagged variable, thus we will need to include another instrument to
account for this uncontrolled individual heterogeneity. Specifically, we need something that
will influence the first-round decision directly but will not directly influence the second round
decision. Given the observed result for the I treatment, we test first round beliefs as a potential
instrument for 1st round allocations. Results (without and with IVs) are shown below in
Table 5.
As with the one-shot setting, the Anderson LM and Cragg-Donald tests indicate that the
instruments are relevant and the Sargan Statistic indicates that the instruments are jointly
valid. The p-value of 0.38 for both the Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of the
Belief variable indicate that both estimators are consistent. Therefore, even in our repeated-
decision environment we fail to reject the exogeneity of beliefs. The p-value of 0.03 for both the
Table 5. Relationship between Allocations, Beliefs and History: with and without Instruments.
H-I
No IV IV
Belief 0.442*** (0.043) 0.453*** (0.082)
1st Allocation (H-NI) 0.624*** (0.033) 0.498*** (0.076)
Constant -0.372 (0.266) 0.335 (0.414)
N 438 438
Adjusted R2/Centered R2 0.6117 0.5989
Tests:
Anderson LM (p) 77.856 (0.00)
Cragg-Donald Wald F 31.274
Sargan Stat (p) 0.051 (0.82)
Beliefs:
Wu-Hausman F (p) 0.781 (0.38)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 (p) 0.786 (0.38)
1st Allocation:
Wu-Hausman F (p) 4.744 (0.03)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 (p) 4.736 (0.03)
***p  0.001
Notes: The No IV specifications are modeled as OLS. The IV specifications are modeled using 2SLS. The
dependent variable is the amount allocated to the group account in the second decision of the H treatment
(H-I). Instruments used are the mean and standard deviation of the information set as well as the elicited
belief from the first allocation decision. Marginal effects are shown, with standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147043.t005
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Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of the 1st Allocation (H-NI) indicate that OLS
is inconsistent and that the 1st Allocation needs to be instrumented. Once accounting for an
individual’s first decision, which we refer to as their history, and instrumenting for potential
endogeneity, we see that contribution behavior is equally driven by the earlier decision and
beliefs (χ2(1) = 0.10, Pr> χ2 = 0.75). The lagged variable continues to need IV methods
applied, and failure to do so would have over-stated the importance of history.
Discussion
We investigate the oft-held belief that experimentally elicited beliefs are endogenous using a
TPG decision environment. We create instruments by exogenously manipulating subject’s
beliefs in a single shot setting where there is no opportunity for endogenous belief formation.
By showing subjects a list of 10 previous contributions and their mean we make this informa-
tion easy to understand and encapsulate other important aspects of the implied distribution
over contributions such as its variance.
We find that our proposed instruments, the mean and standard deviation of the informa-
tion set, are valid and relevant instruments. Perhaps surprisingly, we fail to reject the exogene-
ity of elicited beliefs in either our one-shot or repeated-decision settings. TPG allocations are
determined by a base contribution and beliefs in a one shot-setting. In the repeated-decision
environment, once we instrument for first-round allocations, we find that second-round allo-
cations are driven equally by beliefs and history. Failing to instrument history overstates its
importance. Interestingly, our results are in line with previous research in that our estimate of
the effect of beliefs on decision making is comparable to Smith’s [6] estimate of beliefs on deci-
sion making in a linear public good experiment.
Future research should examine the relationship between the belief elicitation procedure
and potential endogeneity of beliefs. With appropriately designed IVs, we can test the influence
of belief elicitation methodology on the potential endogeneity of beliefs. Our elicitation was
very specific: beliefs about the other three players, paying for exact correctness, and beliefs
were elicited before the decision. Any aspect of these design features could contribute to our
failure to reject the exogeneity of stage-one beliefs. Additional careful research will be required
to confirm whether the result holds generally, or whether some elicitation procedures are
‘cleaner’ than others for this purpose.
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